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Acknowledging the role of institutions in economic growth is a recent trend. Much 
of the literature that do take political diversity into account also focus on measures 
such as index on rule of law or democracy index. In this paper, countries are 
largely divided into two groups, democracy and oligarchy, according to their 
political systems. However, when distinguishing political regimes, I introduce two 
other proxies: tax rate and entry barrier to entrepreneurship. In democracies, 
political power is in the hands of the majority; thus, for more redistribution, tax 
rates are high and entry barrier to entrepreneurship is low. In contrast, the power is 
held by the economic elite, or the entrepreneurs, in oligarchies; therefore, tax rates 
are low and entry barriers are high. This paper presents an empirical model that 
studies the effect of different political systems on long-run growth. Through fixed-
effect regression analysis on panel data, I discuss how high tax rates and low entry 
barriers, thus more democratic societies, lead to higher economic growth. 
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 For several decades, economics was a lone field with no connections to 
other areas of studies. Economic phenomenon were analyzed and explained by 
economic factors only. However, a recent trend shows that economists are now 
beginning to acknowledge the role that other noneconomic sectors play in the 
economy. It is along this tendency of convergence in academic fields that I focus 
on the political implications in an economy. Why do states implement such 
different policies? It is quite clear what actions are efficient in terms of economic 
growth. Nonetheless, it is believed by experience that knowing and actually 
carrying out certain actions in a society is a dissimilar matter, leading to 
discrepancies in economic freedom. It is here that political regimes and institutions 
come into the spotlight when analyzing economic growth. 
This paper obtains its basic motivation from Acemoglu (2008). Here, it 
assumes that two types of political regimes, democracy and oligarchy, exist. 
However, when distinguishing political regimes, two measures are introduced: tax 
rate and entry barrier to entrepreneurship. In democracies, political power is in the 
hands of the majority; thus, for more redistribution, tax rates are high and entry 
barrier to entrepreneurship is low. In contrast, the power is held by the economic 
elite, or the entrepreneurs, in oligarchies; therefore, tax rates are low and entry 
barriers are high. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an 
introduction on related literature in economic growth and political economy. 
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Section 3 discusses the empirical framework used in this paper. Section 4 gives 
detailed description on the data I employ. Section 5 presents empirical results based 
on the model and its implications. Section 6 briefly discusses potential extensions 
and concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Why are some countries rich, while the others are poor? What brings out 
the divergence in growth rates among nations? Until now, scholars involved in the 
study of economic growth have gone and still are going on endless quests to 
provide answers for the difference between the wealth of countries. Although some, 
like Leamer (1998) and Galor, Moav, and Vollrath (2003), found the underlying 
reason for delays in industrialization in initial factor endowments such as natural 
resource abundance or distribution of land, it was soon revealed that amount of 
capital and labor alone was not enough to explain this contrast. Examples of factors 
that emerged later to further elucidate the issue include technological progress, 
education, and inequality. According to Romer (1991), Human capital is essential 
in the research sector in that it generates new products or ideas that trigger 
technological advance. This is presented empirically in Barro (1991), where he 
uses initial (1960 in this case) level of GDP per capita and school enrollment rates 
as proxies of initial and physical capital. “The cross-section evidence of countries 
show that the growth rate of real per capita GDP is positively related to initial 
human capital and negatively related to initial level of real per capita GDP” (Barro 
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1991, 407).  
Many studies also link the factors mentioned above with politics to 
furnish a more detailed justification on growth rates. Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996) 
point out how incumbent innovators have sufficient influence in politics to deter 
the emergence of superior technologies, which restricts the process of technological 
change necessary for economic growth. Inequality is also seen as harmful for 
growth, as it reflects distributional conflicts in a society that lead to less allocation 
of resources to growth promoting activities (Persson and Tabellini 1994). Alesina 
and Rodrik (1994) further provide evidence of how economic growth and welfare 
do not go hand in hand. They show that, in a society consisting of only capitalists 
and workers, maximizing the economy’s growth rate is the optimal policy only for 
governments that care about capitalists. Engerman and Sokoloff (1977) focus on 
the cases of U.S. and Canada exclusively, finding the reason for their economic 
success in the difference in degree of inequality in wealth, human capital, and 
political power. Education also participates in demonstrating the path of economic 
growth. In Bourguignon and Verdier (2000)’s model, education is both a stimulator 
of growth and a determinant of political participation. As a consequence, 
depending on initial conditions, some developing economies become locked in a 
state with slowly growing authoritarian regimes with low incomes, while others are 
on a dynamic path with rapid growth, democratization, and the emergence of a 
middle class. Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2006) highlight the role of high-
skilled managers for innovation, since they engage in both the adaptation of 
technologies from the world and innovation activities. Voting system is mentioned 
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alongside as well in works such as Romer (1975) and Roberts (1977). 
It is from this attempt that recent 10-15 years of work introduce the role of 
institutions that was somewhat neglected in the commonly named mainstream 
economics. For instance, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) find the 
reversal of economies that were rich in the 1500s in the difference of the 
institutions the Europeans introduced. This is due to the fact that the Europeans 
tended to take advantage of then-superior civilization through tax or plantations, 
while they employed institutions that encouraged investment in poor countries. 
This point of view is also developed in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005), 
suggesting that increased political power of merchant groups enabled them to 
demand significant changes in institutions to protect their property rights. Similar 
arguments are made in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2000), although in this 
case they relate mortality rates of European colonists to the type of institutions the 
colonists establish. Robinson and Nugent (2001) go a step further, suggesting that 
not only the initial institutional difference but also the comparative institutional 
evolution critically determined the difference in economic growth. According to the 
paper, this evolution is a result of diverse legal environment stemming from 
differences in the nature of political competition.  
Still, the main focus of related literature on the properties of institution 
varies. Meltzer and Richard (1981) stress the size of government, or redistribution, 
by demonstrating the positive relationship between the difference of mean income 
and income of the decisive voter and the approval for redistribution. On the other 
hand, some studies point out specific policies or actions of institutions. Parente and 
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Prescott (1999) articulate that poor countries are poor since they employ 
arrangements such as protected monopoly rights that lead to inefficient use of 
inferior technologies. Sonin (2003) also addresses this matter, evincing how the 
rich may favor poor protection of property rights since they have the incentives to 
invest in private property protection. Caselli and Gennaioli (2003) refer to dynastic 
management, “the inter-generational transmission of control over assets that is 
typical of family-owned firms”, as a potential source of inefficiency. Some, like Xu 
(2011), highlight the individual case of China as a successful example of unique 
reforms on China’s institutions. Although the superiority of institutions, especially 
those that are liberalized or democratized, should not be trusted blindly (see, e.g., 




3. Empirical Framework 
3.1 Basic neoclassical growth model 
 I first consider a basic neoclassical growth model such as Solow (1956) 
and Barro (1991). Here, classical measures are used to capture a country’s 
proximate determinants of economic growth: variables such as investment, 




𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑖𝑡 
= α + 𝛽1 ln(𝑦𝑖,𝑖𝑛𝑡) + 𝛽2 ln(𝑘𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3 ln(ℎ𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4 ln(𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝑔 + 𝛿)  
+𝛽5 ln(𝑔𝑐𝑖𝑡) + 𝑖𝑡 
for 𝑡 = 1, ⋯ , T and 𝑖 = 1, ⋯ , N;    E(𝑋𝑖𝑠ε𝑖𝑡) = 0 ∀ s, t.                (1) 
where 𝑔𝑖𝑡 is annual growth rate of real per capita GDP of country i in period t, 
𝑦𝑖,𝑖𝑛𝑡 is initial real per capita GDP of country i, 𝑘𝑖𝑡 is the investment rate, ℎ𝑖𝑡 is 
average years of schooling for ages 15 and up, 𝑛𝑖𝑡 is population growth rate over 
period t for country i, g is the growth rate of technology, 𝛿 is the depreciation rate, 
and 𝑔𝑐𝑖𝑡  is the government consumption. Following Mankiw et al. (1992), I 
assume that the sum of the growth rate of technology and the depreciation rate is 
constant and equal to 0.05. For initial GDP per capita, I employ the value of period 
0 on period 1 to 5: for example, for years from 1971 to 1975, I use per capita GDP 
of 1970 as the initial value, that of 1975 for years from 1976 to 1980, and so forth. 
The model in Eq. 1 consists of variables that Levine and Renelt (1992) see as being 
robust determinants of growth. They are also introduced in Mankiw et al. (1992) 
and are further developed in many other studies.  
 
3.2 Adjusted model with features of political environment 
In addition to the neoclassical growth model described above, I adopt the 
features of political environment described by Acemoglu (2008). In the paper, there 
exist an infinite number of risk neutral agents that are divided into two types at 
every period t, worker or entrepreneur. While both groups have the same 
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productivity if they become workers, the productivity as an entrepreneur differs. At 
every period t, each agent will be given entrepreneurial skills and will either 
possess a business or not. Each will make a decision on whether to become a 
worker or an entrepreneur; then, those who choose to become an entrepreneur 
makes investment, employment, hiding decisions, and pay entry cost to 
entrepreneurship if not an incumbent. Here, hiding decision refers to entrepreneurs 
concealing their revenues in order to avoid taxation. This puts an upper barrier on 
the level of implementable taxation. Agents also select policies through majority 
voting. They choose the level of tax rate on output, lump-sum transfer for each 
agent (which can be seen as welfare policies and are appropriated from tax 
revenues only), and entry cost to entrepreneurship. Under this environment, there 
exist two possible types of equilibrium. First is entry equilibrium, where only 
agents with high abilities become entrepreneurs. This equilibrium is usually spotted 
in a democratic society. In oligarchy, however, sclerotic equilibrium occurs, where 
agents with businesses, or incumbents, stay as entrepreneurs regardless of one’s 
abilities. 
This discrepancy between regimes can be traced back to the question of 
who possesses political power. In oligarchy, the economic elite, or the incumbents, 
holds political influence. Due to this aspect, policies are set to protect the interests 
of the entrepreneurs, i.e., low taxes and high entry costs to hinder newcomers from 
entering. On the other hand, in democratic societies, political power is in the hands 
of the majority. Thus, high tax rates for substantial lump-sum transfers and low 
entry costs are favored by the policymakers.  
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The motivation of this paper is from two policies mentioned above, tax 
rate and entry cost. Until now, a large amount of literature that utilize political 
environment when analyzing economic growth use indices such as the democracy 
index or rule of law. For example, Owen, Videras, and Davis (2009) suggest that, 
using the degree of law and order, quality of institutions works as a measure to 
differentiate regimes. Kosack (2003) employs various democracy indices such as 
Polity index and freedom scales from the Freedom House when demonstrating how 
democracy affects the effectiveness of development aid on improving the quality of 
life. However, here I use tax rate and entry cost to entrepreneurship as proxies to 
political regimes, or in other words, the degree of democracy. Thus, I first modify 
Eq. 1 into the following equations: 
𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡 
  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ln(𝑦𝑖,𝑖𝑛𝑡) + 𝛽2 ln(𝑘𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3 ln(ℎ𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4 ln(𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝑔 + 𝛿) 
+𝛽5 ln(𝑔𝑐𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽6 ln(𝜏𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽7𝑏𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡 ,  (2) 
𝑤𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡  where 𝑢𝑖~𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 𝜎𝑢
2) and 𝑖𝑡~𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 𝜎𝜀
2)  
for 𝑡 = 1, ⋯ , T and 𝑖 = 1, ⋯ , N;    E(𝑋𝑖𝑠ε𝑖𝑡) = 0 ∀ s, t.        (3) 
 
where 𝜏𝑖𝑡  is the tax rate on revenues in country i for period t and 𝑏𝑖𝑡 is the entry 
cost to entrepreneurship in country i. To capture the nature of entry costs, I try 
utilizing a number of indices related to cost of barrier in business. The indices 
tested in this paper are Business Freedom Index (BFREE), Bureaucracy Cost 
(BCOST), Starting a Business (STARTB), and Regulation (REG). Further details 
on the data are given in section 4. I first utilize the random-effects GLS regression 
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model as in Eq. 2, where 𝑢𝑖 is the country-specific random effect. It measures the 
difference between the growth rate of country i and growth rate of the entire world, 
and is “random” since the specific country is picked from a group of countries. The 
random-effects model assumes that there is no correlation between the observed 
variables, 𝑋𝑖𝑡, and the unobserved variable, 𝑢𝑖. Also, the assumption that 𝑢𝑖 is 
independent of 𝑤𝑖𝑡 and 𝑖𝑡 and that 𝑤𝑖𝑡 and 𝑖𝑡 are independent of each other 
is needed, as shown in Eq. 3. 
I also make use of the fixed-effect regression as shown in Eq. 4. Here, 
fixed country effect 𝑞𝑖 is introduced to account for the difference in each state’s 
characteristics. The main difference in the fixed-effects model is that it assumes 
that there is correlation between the observed variables, 𝑋𝑖𝑡, and the unobserved 
variable, 𝑢𝑖. In this case, deviation from mean is utilized as in Eq. 5. Then, OLS is 
used to estimate the coefficients. 
𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑞𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑖𝑡 
 = 𝛼 + 𝑞𝑖 + 𝛽1 ln(𝑦𝑖,𝑖𝑛𝑡) + 𝛽2 ln(𝑘𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽3 ln(ℎ𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4 ln(𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝑔 + 𝛿) 
  +𝛽5 ln(𝑔𝑐𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽5 ln(𝜏𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽6𝑏𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
for 𝑡 = 1, ⋯ , T and 𝑖 = 1, ⋯ , N.     (4) 
𝑔𝑖𝑡 − 𝑔?̅? = (𝑋𝑖𝑡 − 𝑋?̅?)
′𝛽 + (𝑢𝑖 − 𝑢?̅?) + ( 𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?) 
= ?̈?𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′̈ 𝛽 + 𝑖𝑡̈        (5) 
 
In both models I first employ tax rate and entry cost as direct determinants 
of growth rates in order to observe the general implications. Then, tax rate and 
entry cost are utilized as dummy variables as to separate states into two groups as 
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mentioned in Acemoglu (2008).  
 
4. Data  
 The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of real GDP per capita 
from 1971 to 2010. The independent variables are the log of real GDP per capita 
for the year before every period, or period t-1, the log of investment rate, the log of 
annual population growth rate plus 0.05, the log of average years of schooling for 
ages 15 and up, the log of tax rate, and the bureaucracy cost. Literature on 
economic growth usually use average values over the 5-year periods such as 1970 
to 1975. However, due to lack of data, especially for tax rate and bureaucracy cost, 
I use annual data for my empirical analysis.  
 Real GDP per capita for period t-1 measures the difference between initial 
capital stock among countries. While many studies employ the initial year’s 
income or GDP per capita of each 5-year period, I switch this for the lag of GDP 
per capita in order to capture the same implications in my yearly analysis. 
Investment rates are in percentages of GDP. Schooling from Barro-Lee Dataset 
only provides data in 5-year increments. Thus, I assume that the value for average 
years of education is constant throughout the next 4 adjacent years. This is a 
plausible assumption as the education system of states does not go under 
revolutionary changes in such short terms. Tax rate refers to the tax imposed on 
income, profits, and capital gains as a percentage of revenues.  
While there exists robust dataset of indices that measure democracy and 
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political freedom, data regarding barrier to entrepreneurship is very limited, and 
often has a short time span. Thus, I was only able to find four indices that are at 
least moderately related to entry cost in entrepreneurship. Out of them, Starting a 
Business, Bureaucracy Cost, and Regulation Indices come from the same source, 
the Economic Freedom of the World Report by Cato Institute and Fraser Institute. 
Starting a Business Index is “based on the World Bank’s Doing Business data on 
the amount of time and money it takes to start a new limited-liability business, and 
countries where it takes loner or is more costly to start a new business are given 
lower ratings” (Fraser institute, 283). Bureaucracy Cost is “based on the Global 
Competitiveness Report question that asks about the standards on product/service 
quality, energy, and other regulations (outside environmental regulations).” (Fraser 
institute, 283) Ratings of 0-10 are given, where value of 10 indicates that standards 
are lax or non-existent, while 0 means they are among the world’s most stringent 
states. Regulation is an index that summarizes various criteria related to capital, 
labor, and business regulations, including Starting a Business and Bureaucracy 
Cost mentioned above, also using scales from 0 to 10. Business Freedom Index is 
from the Index of Economic Freedom published by the Heritage Foundation. Here, 
“Business Freedom is a quantitative measure of the ability to start, operate, and 
close a business that represents the overall burden of regulation as well as the 
efficiency of government in the regulatory process” (Heritage Foundation, 458). 
Values between 0 and 100 are assigned, where countries with freest business 
environment are given 100.  
Because data on tax rates, Starting a Business, Bureaucracy Costs, 
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Regulation, and Business Freedom index suffers from deficiency, I employ 
unbalanced panel data for my analysis. My observations range around 900 to 1300 
from 90 to 110 countries, depending on the data I use. Table 1 provides descriptive 

















Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean SD Description Data Source 
Growth 6916 2.03 7.31 Annual growth rate of 
real GDP per capita 
(chained) 
PWT 7.1 
lnINTGDP 6758 8.40 1.30 Log of initial real GDP 
per capita (chained) 
PWT 7.1 
lnINV 6946 3.02 0.56 Log of investment rate  
(% of GDP) 
PWT 7.1 
lnSCHOOL 5718 1.67 0.66 Log of average years of 






ln(n+g+d) 7560 0.07 0.02 Log of population 
growth + technology 
growth + depreciation 
rate 
World Bank;  
g+d = 0.05 
lnGOV 6907 2.31 0.63 Log of government 
consumption share of 
real GDP per capita 
PWT 7.1 
lnTAX 1617 2.87 0.81 Log of tax rate on 
income, profits, and 
capital gains  
(% of revenue) 
World Bank 
BCOST 1379 5.40 1.77 5Cii. Index of 
Bureaucracy Costs 
Economic 
Freedom of the 
World Report 
STARTB 1479 7.55 1.90 5Ciii. Index of Starting 
a Business 
Economic 
Freedom of the 
World Report 
REG 3746 5.60 1.36 5. Regulation Economic 
Freedom of the 
World Report 
lnBFREE 2244 4.13 0.26 Business Freedom Index Index of 
Economic 
Freedom 




5. Empirical Analysis: Results and Discussion 
5.1 Growth regression with tax rate and entry cost 
 In this section, I discuss the results of the regression based on the model 
described above, and discuss the implication of the results. First, I make use of the 
GLS random-effects and fixed-effects (within) regression models in order to 
account for the fixed effects of each country. Then I include tax rates and test each 
index for entry barrier to entrepreneurship. Lastly, I alter the tax rate and entry cost 
variables into dummy variables to divide countries into two types, democracy and 
oligarchy. 
 Table 2 shows the growth regression results for model with tax rate and 
entry cost using random-effects GLS regression. The main difference here from the 
fixed-effects model is that “in a random effects model, the unobserved variables are 
assumed to be uncorrelated with (or, more strongly, statistically independent of) all 
the observed variables” (Allison, 2). Some show significance in the model, but 
certain variables such as tax rate and Starting a Business index loses significance 
altogether. 
However, if we take a look at the correlation, it is easy to conclude that 
fixed-effects model is a better fit for my panel data. Since the correlation between 
the unobserved variables and all the other observed variables is high (with a value 
of -0.9589 in the case of regression including Business Freedom Index; for all other 
regressions, this value is constantly very high, ranging between -0.88 and -0.99.), I 
employ the fixed-effects regression from now on. 
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Table 2 Growth Regression Results Using Random-Effects GLS Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth 
      
lnINTGDP -1.244*** -0.746** -1.423*** -1.194*** -1.447*** 
 (0.148) (0.292) (0.265) (0.262) (0.267) 
lnINV 2.185*** 3.897*** 5.004*** 3.838*** 3.611*** 
 (0.221) (0.492) (0.550) (0.527) (0.447) 
lnSCHOOL 0.990*** 0.923 1.351 1.127 1.633** 
 (0.258) (0.779) (0.851) (0.823) (0.771) 
ln(n+g+d) -0.290** -0.424* -0.543*** -0.433** -0.380* 
 (0.143) (0.231) (0.209) (0.213) (0.212) 
lnGOV -1.481*** -1.021* -0.999* -1.138** -0.414 
 (0.259) (0.567) (0.522) (0.531) (0.507) 
lnTAX  0.0985 0.167 -0.0654 -0.0876 
  (0.301) (0.287) (0.295) (0.289) 
lnBFREE  -3.171***    
  (1.036)    
BCOST   0.257***   
   (0.0626)   
STARTB    -0.0781  
    (0.0814)  
REG     0.272* 
     (0.156) 
Constant 7.596*** 10.36** -3.127 2.002 0.0976 
 (1.421) (4.268) (2.872) (2.754) (2.681) 
      
Observations 4,853 988 808 840 1,173 
Number of 
Countries 
137 100 84 87 98 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
5.1.1 Interpretation for fundamental variables 
Table 3 presents the growth regression results for model with tax rate and 
entry cost. First regression result is done with the basic neoclassical model with 
only fundamental variables in order to compare and contrast with the other results. 
Real GDP per capita in period t-1, investment, and average years of schooling is 
significant at 1% level with same signs in all analysis. The minus sign of real GDP 
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per capita in period shows that growth rate slows down as countries shift from 
developing to developed countries. Increase in investment and years of schooling 
boosts growth, as they imply the rise in the stock of capital and the quality of labor. 
Increase in population, though it varies in its significance level, can be harmful for 
growth as it dilutes the capital stock in a country. This would decrease the amount 
of capital available for each worker and thus lower the steady-state level of output 
per worker. The signs all appear consistent with the neoclassical growth model. 
 
5.1.2 Tax rates and government consumption 
 What is interesting here are the relationships of tax rates and government 
consumption with economic growth. From Table 3, it is possible to notice that 
government consumption and tax rate show significantly negative and positive 
correlation respectively. The negative relationship between level of government 
consumption and the growth rate of GDP are suggested in many literature such as 
Barro (1990), Grier and Tullock (1987), and Landau (1983). The data used here is 
also similar to these studies in that I also hold constant a measure of investment in 
education through average years of schooling; this is due to the fact that 
consumption on education and defense is often considered as an economy’s 
broadly defined investment. This result can be traced back to the fact that 
governments do not usually act in the most efficient way in the economic sense. In 
other words, it is an indication that governments do choose less efficient measures 
which lead to lower productivity. This phenomenon stems from various underlying  
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Table 3 Growth regression results for model with tax rate and entry cost using 
fixed-effect regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth 
      
lnINTGDP -4.241*** -9.017*** -9.116*** -11.02*** -9.181*** 
 (0.296) (1.217) (1.273) (1.288) (0.912) 
lnINV 2.839*** 4.580*** 7.185*** 4.217*** 4.020*** 
 (0.266) (0.664) (0.902) (0.748) (0.554) 
lnSCHOOL 1.207*** 8.356*** 11.89*** 10.86*** 5.721*** 
 (0.307) (2.239) (2.297) (2.411) (1.502) 
ln(n+g+d) -0.565*** -1.059*** -1.113*** -0.698* -0.182 
 (0.177) (0.352) (0.366) (0.361) (0.315) 
lnGOV -3.234*** -6.294*** -6.161*** -6.931*** -2.799*** 
 (0.368) (1.095) (1.505) (1.482) (1.008) 
lnTAX  0.993* 1.219** 1.826*** 1.101** 
  (0.539) (0.594) (0.655) (0.446) 
lnBFREE  -2.548**    
  (1.179)    
BCOST   0.222***   
   (0.0681)   
STARTB    -0.0127  
    (0.104)  
REG     0.610*** 
     (0.204) 
Constant 34.32*** 72.37*** 46.03*** 75.34*** 58.18*** 
 (2.623) (10.39) (11.15) (10.82) (7.715) 
      
Observations 4,853 988 808 840 1,173 
R-squared 0.070 0.128 0.197 0.148 0.146 
Number of 
Countries 
137 100 84 87 98 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
reasons. Government consumption is mostly maintained through tax revenues. 
Thus, in order to increase government consumption, taxes might rise, leading to 
lower tax base. This causes some potential transactions between buyers and sellers 
to not take place, resulting in inefficiency. Sometimes the government intentionally 
embraces actions that impede economic growth but are probably utility-
maximizing for the whole society. Promoting the arts and reducing pollution are 
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good examples. These actions could also come from an individual’s utility 
maximization, such as corruption and kleptocracy, which would be deleterious for 
both economic growth and social well-being. Either way, a rise in government 
consumption has the possibility to induce a decrease in productivity. 
Then what does tax rate tell us? It might seem strange that tax rate and 
government consumption are both used as independent variables in the same 
regression. After all, does not government need tax revenues in order to consume 
goods, which lead to correlation between the two variables? I believe the answer 
lies in the specific data that I choose here. If we take a look at the tax rate, the 
variable is significant at 1% with a positive sign. Thus, increase in tax rates is 
associated with the increase in growth rates. The tax rate here is actually the 
percentage of income, profit, and capital gains, or, simply put, revenue. Therefore, 
higher tax rates of this definition would naturally lead to reduced gaps between 
classes or less inequality in a society. Higher tax rates also often lead to pressures 
for higher redistribution in a society, either through lump-sum distributions as 
mentioned in Acemoglu (2008) or, more commonly, through welfare policies such 
as unemployment compensation and minimum wage system. This is further 
supported by the data. For instance, “in the United States, such transfers now 
amount to 12.2% of GDP, and their share of GDP has more than doubled since the 




5.1.3 Inequality and growth 
The relationship between inequality and growth is somewhat more 
complicated. There exist various channels through which inequality can effect 
economic growth in a positive or negative way, but currently available data are 
unable to empirically define the relationship unquestionably. My empirical results 
here are in accord with a number of economists who claim that inequality is on 
average harmful for growth (e.g., Persson and Tabellini 1991, Alesina and Rodrik 
1991). This is due to the fact that income inequality “leads to policies that do not 
protect property rights and do not allow full private appropriation of returns from 
investment” (Persson and Tabellini, 40). It can also be explained through majority 
voting. As income gap widens, the difference between the income of the median 
voter and the average income increases. Then the median voter is more likely to 
choose policies that favor redistribution, which is inefficient from the view of 
economic growth. Social unrest expressed by crime or political instability as 
different groups compete for power is another factor that applies pressure for more 
redistribution. 
 
5.1.4 Entry barrier to entrepreneurship 
 Results for various measures of entry barrier to entrepreneurship also 
appear in Table 3. According to Acemoglu (2008), high entry cost for new 
entrepreneurs suppress the economic growth of a country since those with high 
abilities cannot make full use of their entrepreneurial skills. However, the 
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regression results here vary according to the index I choose. The four indices are 
similar in that larger values refer to a freer environment for entrepreneurship with 
less regulations and costs. Thus, if we assume that the theory in Acemoglu (2008) 
is correct, economic growth should be positively related to the economic freedom 
indices. Bureaucracy Cost brings similar results to the table as Starting a Business 
Index and the Regulation Index: higher values denote low entry barrier to 
entrepreneurship, thus the positive sign with significance at 1% or 5% level. 
Business Freedom, on the other hand, has a negative relationship with growth rates. 
Therefore, this suggests that countries with less freedom in entrepreneurship tend 
to have high growth rates, which is against my findings with other three indices.  
I believe this contrary result is due to the definition of the Business 
Freedom index. The Business Freedom index is composed of 10 factors that are all 
weighted equally. Among them, some criteria are questionable whether they 
represent the exact meaning of “entry barrier” in the context of Acemoglu (2008). 
For instance, minimum capital requirement or the procedure of obtaining a license 
are hard to be considered as ‘pure waste’ if they reflect certain measures necessary 
for financial stability in businesses or processes for evaluation of suitable 
candidates. Since absolute average values are used for the index, a country with 
outstanding scores in 9 areas could receive a significantly lower ranking according 
to the score of the tenth criterion. For example, “Canada receives scores of 100 in 
nine of the 10 factors, but the 14 licensing procedures required by the government 
equate to a score of 64.5 for that factor” (2012 Index of Economic Freedom, 459). 
Hence, this might be the culprit of the negative relationship between BFREE and 
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economic growth.  
 
5.2 Tax rate and entry cost as dummy variables 
 Next, I try to employ tax rate and entry cost as dummy variables as to 
divide countries into two groups, democracy and oligarchy, as mentioned in 
Acemoglu (2008). For the countries with available data, I define those with tax rate 
and entry barrier indices values above median as democratic societies. States with 
values under median are categorized as oligarchic societies. For countries with data 
ranging across the median, I count the number of observations above and under 
median respectively and assign the type of regime closer to that specific country. 
For those with exactly same number of observations for democracy and oligarchy, I 
include these countries in both groups.  
Since the correlation between the unobserved variables and all the other 
observed variables is also high in this case, I again employ fixed-effects regression. 
The results are present in Table 4. While some variables such as Bureaucracy Cost 
dummy in (2) and tax rate dummy in (4) lose significance altogether, most 









5.3 Tax rate and entry barrier as a single index 
Next, I try to develop a single index using tax rate and entry barrier. I sort 
countries with high (meaning above median) tax rate and high values for indices 
representing entry cost as democracy. However, not many nations have all its time-
series data above or below the median. Therefore, for countries with more than 70% 
of its data above the median, I label them as democracy. In Table 5, Dum1 
represents the criteria set by tax rate and Business Freedom index. Dum2, Dum3, 
and Dum4 represent tax rate combined with Bureaucracy Cost, Starting a Business, 
and Regulation respectively. The result loses even more significance as countries 
are sorted into two groups. 
 However, it is possible that the loss of significance in the dummy 
variables is from inappropriate criteria in dividing countries into two groups using 
tax rate and indices that represent entry cost. Thus, I try another method in creating 
dummy variables for differences in political regimes. This time, I average the tax 
rates and indices of each country and observe if the value is over the median, 
indicating democracy, or under the median, referring to oligarchy. Then again, I 
combine tax rate with Business Freedom, Bureaucracy Cost, Starting a Business, 
and Regulation Index respectively. I label them as dum21, dum22, dum23, and 







Table 4 Growth regression results for model with tax rate dummy and entry cost 
dummies (fixed-effects regression) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Growth Growth Growth Growth 
     
lnINTGDP -9.071*** -9.407*** -10.71*** -8.552*** 
 (1.194) (1.247) (1.295) (0.898) 
lnINV 4.605*** 7.550*** 4.434*** 4.350*** 
 (0.664) (0.901) (0.746) (0.547) 
lnSCHOOL 8.566*** 11.87*** 11.40*** 6.684*** 
 (2.258) (2.314) (2.343) (1.521) 
ln(n+g+d) -1.036*** -1.102*** -0.735** -0.366 
 (0.351) (0.369) (0.362) (0.313) 
lnGOV -6.240*** -5.874*** -7.231*** -3.122*** 
 (1.100) (1.512) (1.481) (1.002) 
TAXdum 0.623 0.399 0.586 0.126 
 (0.496) (0.499) (0.489) (0.413) 
BFREEdum -0.190    
 (0.531)    
BCOSTdum  0.495*   
  (0.266)   
STARTBdum   0.0413  
   (0.355)  
REGdum    0.686* 
    (0.384) 
Constant 64.28*** 51.57*** 76.59*** 57.22*** 
 (9.685) (11.05) (11.13) (7.817) 
     
Observations 988 808 840 1,173 
R-squared 0.122 0.184 0.141 0.137 
Number of 
Countries 
100 84 87 98 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  In this case, out of two measures for democracy, countries that satisfy 
only one of them are not included in either democracy or oligarchy. As an effort to 
further include these nations, this time I utilize all five criteria available for tax rate 
and entry barrier, and see how many measures of democracy each country satisfies. 
For the dummy variable labeled dumall1, I use a narrow definition and only 
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include countries that satisfy at least 3 out of 5 criteria for either democratic or 
oligarchic society. In dumall2, I employ a broader definition, including nations that 
satisfy more measures for a group, although the number may be smaller than 3. 
This method is implemented since data of tax rate and indices for entry barrier 
might not all exist for a country. For example, the available data for Suriname is 
Business Freedom and Regulation indices; thus, it cannot be included in any group 
by the standards given in dumall1. However, both of these two indices indicate that 
Suriname is an oligarchic society; therefore, I include Suriname in the oligarchy 
group in dumall2.  
The results are in Table 6. Here, the basic neoclassical variables mostly 
stay consistent with the results shown in the earlier part of the chapter. The sign of 
dummy variables are all positive, indicating that democracy is positively correlated 
with higher economic growth. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that this 
criterion for political regimes is better than the previous one. Also, Bureaucracy 
Cost and employment of all five dataset is most efficient in measuring democracy, 







Table 5 Growth regression with dummy variable of tax rate and entry barrier 
combined 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES grth1 grth1 grth1 grth1 
     
lnINTGDP -0.617*** -0.569*** -0.590*** -0.660*** 
 (0.0787) (0.0849) (0.0777) (0.0765) 
lnINV 1.855*** 2.310*** 2.325*** 2.419*** 
 (0.160) (0.182) (0.169) (0.164) 
lnSCHOOL 0.830*** 0.333 0.550*** 0.525*** 
 (0.203) (0.220) (0.194) (0.190) 
ln(n+g+d) -0.211* -0.253** -0.365*** -0.348*** 
 (0.110) (0.106) (0.103) (0.0999) 
lnGOV 0.0568 -0.308** -0.469*** -0.382*** 
 (0.149) (0.149) (0.138) (0.138) 
DUM1 0.585***    
 (0.227)    
DUM2  0.354   
  (0.227)   
DUM3   0.373  
   (0.264)  
DUM4    1.135*** 
    (0.219) 
     
Observations 4,364 3,679 3,818 3,950 
R-squared 0.137 0.173 0.167 0.176 












Table 6 Growth regression with dummy variable of tax rate and entry barrier 
combined using country average values 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth 
       
lnINTGDP -0.644*** -0.719*** -0.629*** -0.666*** -0.581*** -0.540*** 
 (0.0920) (0.104) (0.0995) (0.0960) (0.0767) (0.0765) 
lnINV 2.185*** 2.803*** 2.760*** 2.232*** 1.943*** 1.766*** 
 (0.180) (0.240) (0.216) (0.216) (0.162) (0.156) 
lnSCHOOL 0.644*** 0.501* 0.673*** 0.797*** 0.595*** 0.752*** 
 (0.221) (0.280) (0.242) (0.238) (0.196) (0.201) 
ln(n+g+d) -0.286** -0.0985 -0.533*** -0.229* -0.316*** -0.193* 
 (0.126) (0.123) (0.135) (0.133) (0.104) (0.111) 
lnGOV -0.198 -0.716*** -1.192*** -0.350* -0.113 -0.0884 
 (0.196) (0.212) (0.198) (0.197) (0.140) (0.146) 
DUM21 0.480      
 (0.311)      
DUM22  0.857***     
  (0.265)     
DUM23   0.494**    
   (0.245)    
DUM24    0.540*   
    (0.276)   
DUMALL1     0.730***  
     (0.194)  
DUMALL2      0.532*** 
      (0.204) 
       
Observations 2,736 2,023 2,347 2,646 4,164 4,552 
R-squared 0.182 0.220 0.180 0.150 0.150 0.126 




 The results seem satisfactory enough, with the signs of coefficients being 
consistent throughout the change in the number of samples and variables. 
Nonetheless, multicollinearity has to be checked in order to safely assure the 
relationship between the growth rate and the explanatory variables. Here, I use 
three methods to check if multicollinearity exists.  
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First, I look at the bivariate correlation between the independent variables. 
This is shown in Table 7. However, since this alone is not enough to claim there is 
no multicollinearity, I also examine the tolerance or the vector inflation factor 
(VIF). VIF is a measure that quantifies the magnitude of multicollinearity in an 
OLS regression. The square root value of VIF indicates how large the standard 
error is, in contrast with what it would be if the variable were uncorrelated with 
other explanatory variables in the model. Tolerance is the inverse of VIF. A 
common rule of thumb is that multicollinearity should be suspected if VIF has a 
value over 10 (or equivalently, tolerances of 0.1 or less), although some, like 
Allison, worries about multicollinearity if VIF is larger than 2.5 and the tolerance is 
under 0.4. I present the values for the VIF and the tolerance in Table 8. Lastly, I 
look at the correlations of the estimated coefficients, since high correlations 
between coefficients indicate the possibility of multicollinearity. This is shown in 
Table 9. From these three methods, I conclude that there is not much room for 




Table 7 Correlation between explanatory variables  
7.1 Model with Business Freedom Index 
 lnINTGDP lnINV lnSCHOOL ln(n+g+d) lnGOV lnTAX lnBFREE 
lnINTGDP 1.0000       
lnINV 0.3798 1.0000      
lnSCHOOL 0.7456 0.2523 1.0000     
ln(n+g+d) -0.5200 -0.1886 -0.4836 1.0000    
lnGOV -0.3914 -0.1104 -0.3620 0.1718 1.0000   
lnTAX 0.1830 0.0873 0.2346 -0.1340 -0.1121 1.0000  
lnBFREE 0.7144 0.2967 0.5560 -0.3148 -0.3282 0.2174 1.0000 
 
7.2 Model with Bureaucracy Cost Index 
 lnINTGDP lnINV lnSCHOOL ln(n+g+d) lnGOV lnTAX BCOST 
lnINTGDP 1.0000       
lnINV 0.2511 1.0000      
lnSCHOOL 0.7403 0.1623 1.0000     
ln(n+g+d) -0.5029 -0.0717 -0.4196 1.0000    
lnGOV -0.3661 -0.0784 -0.3444 0.1127 1.0000   
lnTAX 0.1511 -0.0192 0.2209 -0.0259 -0.0492 1.0000  




7.3 Model with Starting a Business Index 
 lnINTGDP lnINV lnSCHOOL ln(n+g+d) lnGOV lnTAX STARTB 
lnINTGDP 1.0000       
lnINV 0.2901 1.0000      
lnSCHOOL 0.7569 0.2122 1.0000     
ln(n+g+d) -0.5288 -0.1345 -0.4562 1.0000    
lnGOV -0.3874 -0.0575 -0.3661 0.1574 1.0000   
lnTAX 0.1714 0.0256 0.2692 -0.0392 -0.1082 1.0000  
STARTB 0.3112 0.2307 0.3402 -0.0633 -0.0925 0.1859 1.0000 
 
 
7.4 Model with Regulation Index 
 lnINTGDP lnINV lnSCHOOL ln(n+g+d) lnGOV lnTAX REG 
lnINTGDP 1.0000       
lnINV 0.3775 1.0000      
lnSCHOOL 0.7501 0.2937 1.0000     
ln(n+g+d) -0.5224 -0.1580 -0.4943 1.0000    
lnGOV -0.4234 -0.1789 -0.3765 0.2047 1.0000   
lnTAX 0.1131 -0.0163 0.2484 -0.1632 -0.0762 1.0000  
REG 0.5201 0.2956 0.5286 -0.2166 -0.3118 0.2330 1.0000 
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Table 8 Vector inflation factors (VIFs) and tolerances 
       
8.1. Model with Business Freedom Index  8.2. Model with Bureaucracy Cost Index 
Variable VIF Tolerance  Variable VIF Tolerance 
       
lnINTGDP 3.74 0.267141  lnINTGDP 2.70 0.370253 
lnSCHOOL 2.41 0.414935  lnSCHOOL 2.34 0.426792 
lnBFREE 2.11 0.473210  ln(n+g+d) 1.38 0.726933 
ln(n+g+d) 1.43 0.698224  lnGOV 1.18 0.844346 
lnGOV 1.21 0.827236  lnINV 1.08 0.927780 
lnINV 1.18 0.850085  lnTAX 1.06 0.941210 
lnTAX 1.08 0.929167  BCOST 1.02 0.984377 
Mean VIF 1.88   Mean VIF 1.54  
 
8.3. Model with Starting a Business Index  8.4. Model with Regulation Index 
Variable VIF Tolerance  Variable VIF Tolerance 
       
lnINTGDP 2.86 0.349649  lnINTGDP 2.92 0.342301 
lnSCHOOL 2.60 0.384424  lnSCHOOL 2.65 0.377666 
ln(n+g+d) 1.45 0.689932  REG 1.56 0.639276 
STARTB 1.21 0.826025  ln(n+g+d) 1.46 0.683520 
lnGOV 1.21 0.826725  lnGOV 1.24 0.804312 
lnINV 1.13 0.888639  lnINV 1.20 0.835956 
lnTAX 1.10 0.907547  lnTAX 1.13 0.887634 
Mean VIF 1.65   Mean VIF 1.74  
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Table 9 Correlations between the estimated coefficients  
9.1 Fixed-effects model with Business Freedom Index 
e(V) lnINTGDP lnINV lnSCHOOL ln(n+g+d) lnGOV lnTAX lnBFREE 
lnINTGDP 1.0000       
lnINV -0.0573 1.0000      
lnSCHOOL -0.5381 -0.1003 1.0000     
ln(n+g+d) 0.0687 -0.0972 0.0773 1.0000    
lnGOV 0.1954 0.0225 -0.1245 0.1014 1.0000   
lnTAX -0.1915 -0.0768 -0.0093 0.0735 0.0260 1.0000  
lnBFREE -0.1255 -0.0309 0.1158 0.0798 0.0176 -0.0482 1.0000 
 
 
9.2 Fixed-effects model with Bureaucracy Cost Index 
e(V) lnINTGDP lnINV lnSCHOOL ln(n+g+d) lnGOV lnTAX BCOST 
lnINTGDP 1.0000       
lnINV -0.0230 1.0000      
lnSCHOOL -0.4875 -0.0318 1.0000     
ln(n+g+d) 0.0381 -0.0552 0.0385 1.0000    
lnGOV 0.1209 0.2422 -0.1309 0.0765 1.0000   
lnTAX -0.1698 -0.1394 -0.1165 0.0441 0.0311 1.0000  




9.3 Fixed-effects model with Starting a Business Index 
e(V) lnINTGDP lnINV lnSCHOOL ln(n+g+d) lnGOV lnTAX STARTB 
lnINTGDP 1.0000       
lnINV -0.1238 1.0000      
lnSCHOOL -0.3564 -0.0050 1.0000     
ln(n+g+d) 0.0474 0.0004 0.0471 1.0000    
lnGOV 0.0968 0.1088 -0.1449 0.0981 1.0000   
lnTAX -0.1508 -0.1261 -0.1407 0.0466 0.0854 1.0000  
STARTB -0.3396 -0.0139 -0.3068 0.0127 0.0605 0.0044 1.0000 
 
 
9.4 Fixed-effects model with Regulation Index 
e(V) lnINTGDP lnINV lnSCHOOL ln(n+g+d) lnGOV lnTAX REG 
lnINTGDP 1.0000       
lnINV 0.0069 1.0000      
lnSCHOOL -0.3654 -0.0373 1.0000     
ln(n+g+d) 0.0672 -0.0694 0.0901 1.0000    
lnGOV 0.0812 0.0934 -0.0147 -0.0163 1.0000   
lnTAX -0.0862 -0.0519 -0.1168 0.0934 -0.0632 1.0000  




5.5 Further analysis on the relationship between democracy and growth 
 The model that I utilize above has a possibility to provoke certain 
problems since there is no consensus on the relationship between democracy and 
growth. Empirical results show that higher levels of democracy may or may not be 
beneficial to economic growth. As a result, some like Barro(1996) suggest that 
democracy boosts growth in the earlier stages of political development, but 
becomes weakly negative as initial levels of democracy are enhanced. This is due 
to the fact that democracy is sort of a luxury good. Political freedom is thus 
available to the rich countries that can afford the decrease in economic growth.  
 Keeping this relationship in mind, to analyze the effect of tax rates and 
entry barriers in detail I add interaction terms to my previous model. Here, I add 
democracy (noted as DEM) to control for various levels of political freedom. Thus, 
additional terms of democracy, democracy*tax rate, and democracy*entry barrier 
appear in the adjusted model. I employ the democracy data from the Freedom 
House; the index is scaled from 1 to 7, with 7 implying the freest political 
environment. I also utilize fixed-effects regression here since the correlation 
between the observed and unobserved variables is high. The regression results are 
shown in Table 10.  






Table 10 Fixed-effects regression with interaction terms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth 
      
lnINTGDP -4.485*** -8.475*** -7.491*** -10.53*** -9.413*** 
 (0.317) (1.275) (1.305) (1.317) (0.926) 
lnINV 2.638*** 4.226*** 8.084*** 4.192*** 3.982*** 
 (0.276) (0.683) (0.891) (0.740) (0.556) 
lnSCHOOL 1.163*** 6.492*** 7.684*** 8.093*** 4.905*** 
 (0.335) (2.292) (2.319) (2.461) (1.510) 
ln(n+g+d) -0.555*** -1.093*** -1.066*** -0.700* -0.216 
 (0.184) (0.352) (0.356) (0.357) (0.314) 
lnGOV -3.410*** -7.477*** -6.514*** -7.206*** -3.028*** 
 (0.391) (1.384) (1.491) (1.488) (1.014) 
lnTAX  3.154*** 4.023*** 3.760*** 3.005*** 
  (1.154) (1.189) (1.202) (0.973) 
DEM -0.356*** -0.733 2.715*** -0.163 0.159 
 (0.0961) (2.856) (1.030) (1.051) (0.895) 
lnTAX*DEM  -0.541** -0.743*** -0.583** -0.452** 
  (0.262) (0.276) (0.290) (0.222) 
lnBFREE  -3.701*    





   
      
BCOST   0.680***   
   (0.106)   
BCOST* 
DEM 
  -0.219*** 
(0.0425) 
  
      
STARTB    -0.402***  
    (0.150)  
STARTB* 
DEM 
   0.188*** 
(0.0587) 
 
      
REG     0.155 
     (0.385) 
REG*DEM     0.108 
     (0.0888) 
Constant 38.79*** 74.90*** 28.06** 75.37*** 60.99*** 
 (2.844) (13.07) (13.00) (12.61) (9.206) 
      
Observations 4,571 972 799 831 1,164 
R-squared 0.073 0.141 0.245 0.172 0.158 
Number of 
Countries 
  133 98 83 86 97 




The first regression is done with the basic neoclassical model, but with the 
democracy index. It shows that democracy is weakly negative with economic 
growth, which is consistent with Barro(1996)’s results. Next, interaction terms are 
introduced into the model. Tax rate shows a steady relationship with economic 
growth regardless of the measures I use for entry barrier. The coefficient for tax 
rate alone is positive, while the interaction term of democracy and tax rate is 
negative. This implies that although increase in tax rate is positively correlated to 
growth in the early stages of democracy, it loses its effect and even becomes 
negatively correlated to growth as a country gains more political freedom.  
 To see this continuous by continuous interaction more closely, I calculate 
the effect of tax rate on growth when democracy is held constant. Table 11 to 14 
shows the relationship between tax rate and economic growth under different levels 
of political freedom. As a country becomes more democratic, tax rate loses its 
significance and the sign also becomes negative. The linear growth prediction is 
graphed in Figure 1, 2, 3, and 4. For certain levels of democracy that loses 
significance, thinner lines are used. Regardless of what measure I employ for entry 






Table 11 Effect of tax rate on growth when democracy is held constant: model with 
Business Freedom Index 
 dy/dx Std. Err z p>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
lnTAX at       
DEM=1 2.612757 .9314299 2.81 0.005 .7871878 4.438326 
=2 2.071936 .7345078 2.82 0.005 .6323272 3.511545 
=3 1.531115 .5904717 2.59 0.010 .373812 2.688419 
=4 .9902945 .5431639 1.82 0.068 -.0742872 2.054876 
=5 .4494737 .6153147 0.73 0.465 -.756521 1.655468 
=6 -.0913471 .7742173 -0.12 0.906 -1.608785 1.426091 
=7 -.6321679 .9784823 -0.65 0.518 -2.549958 1.285622 
 
 
Figure 1 Linear prediction of growth on tax rate for different states of democracy: 




























Table 12 Effect of tax rate on growth when democracy is held constant: model with 
Bureaucracy Cost 
 dy/dx Std. Err z p>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
lnTAX at       
DEM=1 3.279944 .9570773 3.43 0.001 1.404107 5.155781 
=2 2.537268 .7558925 3.36 0.001 1.055746 4.01879 
=3 1.794591 .6158252 2.91 0.004 .5875955 3.001586 
=4 1.051914 .582751 1.81 0.071 -.0902569 2.194085 
=5 .3092374 .6726422 0.46 0.646 -1.009117 1.627592 
=6 -.4334394 .8472231 -0.51 0.609 -2.093966 1.227087 




Figure 2 Linear prediction of growth on tax rate for different states of democracy: 



























Table 13 Effect of tax rate on growth when democracy is held constant: model with 
Starting a Business Index 
 dy/dx Std. Err z p>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
lnTAX at       
DEM=1 3.176673 .9722298 3.27 0.001 1.271137 5.082208 
=2 2.593419 .7837922 3.31 0.001 1.057215 4.129624 
=3 2.010165 .6722069 2.99 0.003 .6926642 3.327667 
=4 1.426912 .6766286 2.11 0.035 .1007441 2.753079 
=5 .843658 .7951244 1.06 0.289 -.7147572 2.402073 
=6 .2604042 .9874471 0.26 0.792 -1.674956 2.195765 




Figure 3 Linear prediction of growth on tax rate for different states of democracy: 





























Table 14 Effect of tax rate on growth when democracy is held constant: model with 
Regulation Index 
 dy/dx Std. Err z p>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
lnTAX at       
DEM=1 2.553344 .7825954 3.26 0.001 1.019485 4.087203 
=2 2.101836 .6135127 3.43 0.001 .8993734 3.304299 
=3 1.650328 .4891942 3.37 0.001 .691525 2.609131 
=4 1.19882 .4485477 2.67 0.008 .3196825 2.077957 
=5 .7473117 .5119083 1.46 0.144 -.2560102 1.750634 
=6 .2958036 .64952 0.46 0.649 -.9772321 1.568839 




Figure 4 Linear prediction of growth on tax rate for different states of democracy: 



























While the results are quite straightforward for tax rates, it is not so simple 
for entry barriers. From the regression results in Table 10, it is easy to see that the 
interaction terms for Business Freedom and Regulation loses significance. 
Therefore, I concentrate on the models that employ Bureaucracy Cost and Starting 
a Business Index. However, since they show different signs, I also look at the 
values of coefficients for entry barriers under certain fixed levels of democracy. 
These results are shown in Table 15 and 16 respectively. 
For Bureaucracy Cost, its effect is positive for nations with low levels of 
political freedom and negative for those with much political freedom. In other 
words, a decrease in the cost occurred by bureaucracy is beneficial economics 
growth in less democratic societies. However, as a country becomes more 
democratic, further improvement in bureaucracy costs is not as beneficial as before, 
even decreasing growth rates. I believe this is due to the fact that bureaucracy cost 
becomes inevitable in certain areas as a country develops. For example, protecting 
the environment is also a luxury good since the foremost goal for developing 
countries is high economic growth. However, as other interests outside growth are 
being focused, certain measures are taken to protect these rights, which could often 
contradict with economic growth. 
In the case of Starting a Business Index, its effect is mostly positive for 
economic growth, except for countries with the lowest levels of democracy 
(DEM=1). Thus, less time and cost required to start a business is roughly beneficial 
to growth, even for countries with high levels of political freedom. This is mostly 
consistent with my theory throughout this paper. 
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Table 15 Effect of Bureaucracy Cost on growth when democracy is held constant 
 dy/dx Std. Err z p>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
BCOST at       
DEM=1 .4609799 .0782872 5.89 0.000 .3075398 .6144199 
=2 .2418835 .0679411 3.56 0.000 .1087213 .3750456 
=3 .0227871 .0819127 0.28 0.781 -.1377589 .183333 
=4 -.1963093 .1114 -1.76 0.078 -.4146493 .0220307 
=5 -.4154057 .1473663 -2.82 0.005 -.7042383 -.1265731 
=6 -.6345021 .1860921 -3.41 0.001 -.9992359 -.2697684 





























Table 16 Effect of Starting a Business Index on growth when democracy is held 
constant 
 dy/dx Std. Err z p>|z| 95% Conf. Interval 
STARTB at       
DEM=1 -.214233 .115191 -1.86 0.063 -.440003 .0115376 
=2 -.02654 .1044187 -0.25 0.799 -.231197 .1781173 
=3 .1611533 .1242093 1.30 0.194 -.082292 .4045989 
=4 .3488462 .1638382 2.13 0.033 .0277291 .6699632 
=5 .5365391 .2124814 2.53 0.012 .1200831 .952995 
=6 .724232 .2652246 2.73 0.006 .2044012 1.244063 




Figure 6 Linear prediction of growth on Starting a Business Index for different 



























 This paper presents an empirical application of two proxies, tax rate and 
entry cost, for political regimes suggested in Acemoglu (2008) on long-term 
economic growth. Through fixed-effects regression analysis on approximately 100 
countries during 1971-2010, I answer some of the questions presented before. Does 
political regime, or more specifically, the level of democracy, have a significant 
effect on long-term growth? Can tax rate and entry cost to entrepreneurship work 
as proxies for democracy? I conclude as yes to both questions. Although the results 
are sometimes not entirely consistent with each other, considering the fact that the 
definitions of indices are slightly different from each other and that there is a heavy 
lack of data available, the results are quite significant. Also, signs become 
consistent if used as part of a dummy variable. High tax rates and low entry costs 
to business help boost economic growth. 
 It is also possible to conclude that political regimes are not clear-cut; that 
is, it is not desirable to define a country as democracy or oligarchy as a whole. As 
the loss of significance in the regression with dummy variables shows, I believe 
political regimes are more of a spectrum. A country can be said to be closer to 
democracy or oligarchy, but dividing this spectrum in the middle is not an efficient 
way to distinguish political regimes.  
 The shortcoming of this paper is that I use annual data analysis, while 
most economic growth analysis is based on 5-year averages. This was an inevitable 
choice since data for tax rate and entry barrier were not abundant enough. Use of 5-
year average values could lead to each country having only 1 or 2 observations; 
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therefore, I employed yearly data. I did try to make my model as close to that using 
usual methods as possible, such as utilizing initial per capita GDP to control for 
endogeneity. However, I do realize that the result may change if 5-year averages 
are used instead. 
 As I state above, this paper has suffered from lack of data, and there also 
exists a possibility that the indices that I used might not be a correct measure of 
entry cost to entrepreneurship. Most of the indices reference World Bank’s Doing 
Business report, and I would have used this had it not had a short time span (data 
starts from 2004). It would be interesting to see if the result changes if this World 
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정치 체제의 차이가 경제 성장에 주요한 
요소로 작용하는지에 대한 실증 분석 
 
이 유 림 
경제학부 경제학 전공 
서울대학교 대학원 
 
최근 들어 제도(institution)를 경제 성장에 반영하는 추세가 강
해지고 있다. 그러나 지금까지의 연구들은 정치 체제의 차이를 반영할 
때 민주주의 지수 등 제 3의 기관이 가공한 자료를 주로 사용해왔다. 본 
논문에서는 아세모글루(Acemoglu, 2008)의 이론에서 영향을 받아 장기 
경제 성장에 대한 분석을 진행하였다. 즉, 본 모델에서는 정치 체제 혹
은 민주주의의 정도를 측정하기 위하여 세율과 기업을 세울 때 처하는 
진입장벽을 사용하였다. 민주주의 사회에서는 정치적인 힘이 다수에게 
있으므로 재분배를 선호하기 때문에 높은 세율을 원하며, 낮은 진입장벽
을 선호한다. 반면 과두제에서는 기업가의 이익을 보호하려 하기 때문에 
세율이 낮고 진입장벽이 높은 경향을 보여준다. 본 논문에서는 패널 자
료에 대한 고정 효과 모형(fixed-effects model)을 사용하여 민주주의에 
가까운 사회일수록 세율이 높고 진입장벽이 낮음을 보여주었다.  
 
주요어 : 경제 성장; 정치 경제; 민주주의; 세율; 진입장벽 
학  번 : 2011-20188 
